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OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

BOT

delivered on 14 October 2008 1( )

Case C‑42/07

Liga

Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional (CA/LPFP)

Baw International Ltd

v

Departamento de

Jogos πŸ”” da Santa Casa da MisericΓ³rdia de Lisboa

(Reference for a preliminary ruling from

the Tribunal de Pequena InstΓ’ncia Criminal do Porto πŸ”” (Portugal))

(Legislation of a

Member State granting a single entity an exclusive right to organise and operate

betting on the internet πŸ”” – β€˜Technical regulation’ within the meaning of Directive

98/34/EC – Restriction of the freedom to provide services – Overriding reasons πŸ”” relating

to the public interest – Protection of consumers and maintenance of public order –

National legislation appropriate for attaining πŸ”” objectives – Proportionality)

Table of

contents

I – Introduction

A – General presentation of the case

B – Games of chance and

gambling

1. A πŸ”” wide variety of games

2. A significant economic factor

3. An activity

that gives rise to serious risks

4. An activity strictly regulated πŸ”” by the Member

States

5. The impact of new means of communication

II – The legal context

A – Community

law

1. Secondary law

a) πŸ”” No measures governing games of chance and gambling in

particular

b) Directive 98/34

2. Primary law and its interpretation

a) The Treaty

b)

Case-law

B πŸ”” – National law

a) Information provided by the referring court

2. Additional

information provided by the Portuguese Government

a) The types of games

i) πŸ”” Casino

games

ii) Lotteries, tombolas and publicity competitions

iii) Lotto games and

betting

b) The regulations of the Santa Casa

III – The main πŸ”” proceedings and the

question referred

IV – Analysis

A – Admissibility of the question referred

B –

Substance of the case

1. Application of πŸ”” Directive 98/34

a) The Court’s opportunity to

interpret Directive 98/34, although the national court does not refer to it

b) The

contested πŸ”” provisions fall within the scope of Directive 98/34

c) The consequences of

failing to give notice of the contested measures

d) The πŸ”” effects of the Court’s judgment

for the referring court

2. The compatibility of the national legislation in issue with

the freedoms πŸ”” of movement

a) The relevant freedom of movement

b) The existence of a

restriction

c) The justification for the restriction

i) Arguments of the πŸ”” parties

ii) My

assessment

– The effect of the limits imposed on the powers of the Member States in the

area of πŸ”” games of chance and gambling

– Consumer protection and the maintaining of

public order may justify measures restricting the freedom to πŸ”” provide off-course betting

on the internet

– The proportionality of the legislation in question

–

Non-discriminatory application

V – Conclusions

I – Introduction

A – πŸ”” General

presentation of the case

1. The problem of the conformity with Community law of the

Member States’ legislation concerning games πŸ”” of chance and gambling has already given

rise to a relatively large number of cases. Nevertheless it continues to give πŸ”” rise to

numerous references from the courts of the Member States, as shown by the number of

cases at present πŸ”” pending before the Court. ( )

2. In the present case, the referring

court needs to be enabled to determine whether πŸ”” its domestic law, in so far as it grants

a single operator the exclusive right to offer off-course bets on πŸ”” the internet,

conforms with Community law.

3. The case concerns the Portuguese legislation which

confers on the Departamento de Jogos da πŸ”” Santa Casa da MisericΓ³rdia de Lisboa ( ), a

centuries-old non-profit-making organisation which has the object of financing causes

in πŸ”” the public interest, the exclusive right to organise and operate lotteries and

off-course betting in the whole of national territory. πŸ”” This exclusive right has been

extended to all electronic means of communication, in particular the internet. The

legislation also provides πŸ”” for penalties in the form of administrative fines on those

who organise such games in breach of the abovementioned exclusive πŸ”” right and who

advertise such games.

4. Baw International Ltd, ( ) an on-line betting company

established in Gibraltar, and the πŸ”” Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional (CA/LPFP) ( )

were fined for offering off-course betting by electronic means and advertising it.

5.

πŸ”” The referring court, before which Bwin and the Liga contested the fines, is uncertain

as to whether its national legislation, πŸ”” in providing for such a system of exclusive

rights for off-course betting on the internet, conforms with Community law.

6. In πŸ”” those

circumstances, I shall submit, first, that legislation of a Member State which grants a

single entity the exclusive right πŸ”” to offer off-course betting on the internet and which

provides for penalties in the form of fines on persons disregarding πŸ”” that right,

constitutes a β€˜technical regulation’ within the meaning of Directive 98/43/EC of the

European Parliament and of the Council. πŸ”” ( ) I shall conclude from this that, if that

legislation was not duly notified to the Commission of the πŸ”” European Communities, it

cannot be relied on against private operators such as the Liga and Bwin.

7. Secondly, I

shall state πŸ”” that such legislation constitutes a restriction of the freedom to provide

services. I shall consider to what extent such legislation πŸ”” may be justified.

8. To

begin with, I shall describe the effect which I think the restriction by Community law

of πŸ”” the powers of the Member States in the field of betting and games of chance should

have. I shall state πŸ”” that the aim of the freedoms of movement is not to open up the

market in games of chance and πŸ”” gambling. I shall argue that a Member State should be

required to open up this activity to the market only πŸ”” if, in law or in fact, it treats

the gambling and games of chance as true economic activities which yield πŸ”” maximum

profits. I shall also argue that the Member States should have a broad discretion in

determining what measures to πŸ”” take in order to protect consumers and to maintain public

order against the excesses of gambling, including determining the gambling πŸ”” services

necessary for that purpose. I shall conclude that Community law should be confined to

prohibiting situations in which restrictive πŸ”” measures taken to protect consumers against

excessive gaming are manifestly distorting their purpose.

9. I shall state that Article

49 EC πŸ”” does not preclude legislation such as the Portuguese legislation at issue if it

satisfies the following conditions, which must be πŸ”” verified by the referring court: the

legislation must be justified by overriding reasons relating to the public interest, it

must πŸ”” be appropriate for ensuring the attainment of the objectives which it pursues, it

must not exceed what is necessary for πŸ”” attaining them and it must not be applied in a

discriminatory way. I shall make the following points regarding those πŸ”” conditions.

10.

First, with regard to the risks created by gambling and games of chance on the

internet, a Member State πŸ”” may legitimately restrict the right to operate such games in

order to protect consumers and to maintain public order.

11. Second, πŸ”” the grant of the

exclusive right to organise and operate such games to a single entity may be an

appropriate πŸ”” measure for pursuing those aims if, first, the Member State has the means

of directing and controlling effectively the operation πŸ”” of gambling and games of chance

by the entity holding that right and, second, if, in actually implementing that

measure, πŸ”” the Member State does not manifestly exceed its margin of discretion.

12.

Third, the grant of an exclusive right to a πŸ”” single non-profit-making entity controlled

by the Member State may be a proportionate measure.

13. Fourth, the legislation in

question, in so πŸ”” far as it grants a single entity the exclusive right to operate

lotteries and off-course betting on the internet is πŸ”” not, in itself, discriminatory.

14.

Before setting out the legal and factual context of the present case, followed by my

analysis, πŸ”” I think it necessary to describe briefly the nature of games of chance and

gambling in the European Union and πŸ”” then the issues to which those activities give

rise.

B – Games of chance and gambling

15. I shall briefly make the πŸ”” following five

points. Games of chance and gambling today include a wide variety of games. They have

considerable economic significance. πŸ”” Nevertheless they give rise to serious risks to

society. They are the subject of strict regulations of different kinds in πŸ”” the Member

States. Finally, electronic means of communication, in particular the internet, are an

important factor in the spread of πŸ”” such games.

1. A wide variety of games

16. The

playing of games the result of which depends on chance, in which πŸ”” the players wager a

stake with valuables or money, appears to be very ancient and common to many societies.

Historians πŸ”” situate their origin in the third millennium BC in the Far East and Egypt. (

) Such games were common πŸ”” in ancient Greece and Rome. ( )

17. Games of chance and

gambling have changed considerably in the course of history πŸ”” and there is a very wide

variety of them today. They may be divided very broadly into four main categories.

18.

πŸ”” The first category consists of lotteries, in which I include bingo games, which are

based on the same principle. This πŸ”” is a pure game of chance in which knowledge and

strategy play no part at all. The result of the πŸ”” game is determined by the drawing by

lot of winning numbers, the result of which is known immediately or later.

19.

πŸ”” Lotteries and bingo games may be organised on a very different scale, from the annual

draw or bingo of a πŸ”” local association with prizes in kind of small value to games

organised by national or regional lotteries aimed at the πŸ”” entire territory of a Member

State or a region of a federal State and which offer a prize that could πŸ”” be as much as

several million euros. They may also be organised in different forms, so that there is

a πŸ”” very wide variety of them.

20. In the course of February 2004 the lotteries of

several Member States decided to set πŸ”” up together a common lottery called

β€˜EuroMillions’. ( )

21. So-called β€˜instant’ or β€˜scratch card’ lotteries have also

appeared in the πŸ”” last 20 years. These offer cards at a modest price on which the result

is printed beneath a film which πŸ”” has to be scratched off with a fingernail or coin.

22.

The second main category of games of chance and gambling πŸ”” is betting. This may be based

on the result of a competition, the occurrence of an event or the existence πŸ”” of

something.

23. The best known and oldest form of betting is on horse races. The punters

are invited to bet πŸ”” on the result of a race in which those taking part, horses and

jockeys, are known in advance. Consequently the πŸ”” punters can place their bets in

reliance on luck and also on their knowledge of the characteristics and the performance

πŸ”” of the horses and jockeys. In addition to betting on horse races, there is now also

betting on sporting events.

24. πŸ”” The winnings depend either on the total amount of bets

or on the odds agreed with the bookmaker.

25. In the πŸ”” third place we have casinos.

Different games are authorised in these establishments, which are open to the public.

They have πŸ”” long been regarded as reserved for wealthy clients who are able to gamble

large sums in games that are complicated, πŸ”” or supposed to be such, surrounded by rites

and ceremonial.

26. Gaming machines must be placed in fourth place. They were πŸ”” invented

in the United States in the first half of the 19th century and were immediately

successful. ( ) They πŸ”” are slot machines into which the player is invited to insert a

coin or token and which show a pre-programmed πŸ”” result by means of a random computer

system. Consequently the moment and frequency with which the result shown by the

πŸ”” machine corresponds to a winning combination depend on chance.

2. A significant

economic factor

27. In recent years gambling and games of πŸ”” chance have increased

significantly. They now constitute what may be described as a considerable economic

factor. In the first place, πŸ”” they generate a very large income for the organisations

that operate them. ( ) Secondly, they provide a substantial number πŸ”” of jobs in the

different Member States. ( )

3. An activity that gives rise to serious risks

28.

However, games of πŸ”” chance and gambling give rise to serious risks to society in relation

to the players and to the operators that πŸ”” organise them.

29. First, they may lead

players to jeopardise their financial and family situation, and even their health.

30.

Games of πŸ”” chance and gambling by nature allow only a very small number of players to

win, failing which they will lose πŸ”” and cannot go on. In the great majority of cases,

therefore, players lose more than they gain. However, the excitement πŸ”” of the game and

the promise of winning, sometimes very large amounts, may lead players to spend on

gambling more πŸ”” than the share of their budget available for leisure pursuits.

31. This

behaviour may therefore have the consequence that players are πŸ”” no longer able to fulfil

their social and family obligations. It may also lead to a situation of real addiction

πŸ”” to games of chance and gambling, comparable to addiction caused by drugs or alcohol. (

)

32. Secondly, because of the πŸ”” very considerable stakes involved in gambling and games

of chance, they are likely to be open to manipulation on the πŸ”” part of the organiser who

may wish to arrange matters so that the result of the draw or the sporting πŸ”” event is the

most favourable to himself. Furthermore, in that connection an individual player has no

really effective means of πŸ”” verifying that the conditions in which gambling takes place

actually conform with what is announced.

33. Finally, games of chance and πŸ”” gambling may

be a means of β€˜laundering’ money obtained illegally. Such money can be gambled in the

hope of winning πŸ”” more. It can also be converted into profit if the criminal is also the

owner of the gambling establishment.

4. An πŸ”” activity strictly regulated by the Member

States

34. In the course of history games of chance and gambling have often been

πŸ”” condemned on moral and religious grounds and also the maintaining of public order. ( )

Nevertheless they have been accepted πŸ”” as a social fact.

35. The reaction of governing

authorities has oscillated between total prohibition, strict regulation, while

providing that the πŸ”” revenue from games of chance and gambling should serve exclusively

to finance causes of public interest, and encouragement so as πŸ”” to profit from the manna

represented by this voluntary tax.

36. Nowadays games of chance and gambling are

subject to restrictive πŸ”” regulation in most Member States of the European Union.

37. In a

number of those States ( ) these restrictions take πŸ”” the form of a ban in principle on

games of chance and gambling, with specific exceptions. Likewise in most Member πŸ”” States,

( ) the operation of a game of chance or gambling by a private operator, where it is

provided πŸ”” for, is subject to obtaining a licence from the appropriate authority. In

addition, the number of operators who may be πŸ”” authorised to operate a particular game is

normally limited, usually by a quota.

38. In several Member States the operation of

πŸ”” games of chance and gambling may also be the subject of an exclusive right granted to a

State organisation or πŸ”” a private operator. ( )

39. There are considerable differences in

the legislation in force in the Member States. Apart from πŸ”” the differences in operating

systems, there are exceptions to the general prohibition where it exists, and the

definition of β€˜games πŸ”” of chance and gambling’ and the scope of the national legislation

are not uniform. The same game may therefore be πŸ”” authorised in one Member State and

prohibited in another or be treated differently. ( )

40. Finally, the tax treatment of

πŸ”” games of chance and gambling differs considerably from one Member State to another

because, in some Member States, the profits πŸ”” generated by the operation of such games

and gambling must be appropriated, in varying proportions, to causes of general

interest. πŸ”” Likewise, the share of the winnings distributed to players varies

significantly.

5. The impact of new means of communication

41. Until about πŸ”” twenty years

ago, games of chance and gambling were accessible only in specific places such as the

numerous outlets for πŸ”” betting and lottery tickets, race courses and casinos. This meant

that anyone wishing to bet or gamble had to make πŸ”” a journey and it could only be done

during the opening times of the premises in question.

42. The appearance of πŸ”” electronic

means of communication in the 1990s, such as mobile phones, interactive television and,

above all, the internet, changed the πŸ”” situation radically. Thanks to these new means of

communication, punters can play games at any time without leaving their home.

43. πŸ”” In

this way betting and gaming have been considerably facilitated. Access to these

pursuits has been encouraged by the following πŸ”” factors. First, the number of persons who

can use electronic means of communication is increasing regularly. ( ) Second, they πŸ”” are

becoming easier and easier to use and they function in an integrated system. ( )

Lastly, the financial transactions πŸ”” can be carried out very easily through those means

of communication.

44. In addition, electronic means of communication, particularly the

internet, πŸ”” enable persons residing in one Member State to gain physical access not only

to on‑line games offered by operators established πŸ”” in that State, but also to those

offered by operators established in other Member States or non-member countries.

45.

Therefore these πŸ”” new means of communication have permitted a significant increase in the

provision of games of chance and gambling, which have πŸ”” become extremely successful. (

)

II – The legal context

A – Community law

1. Secondary law

a) No measures governing

games of chance πŸ”” and gambling in particular

46. Games of chance and gambling have not so

far been the subject of any regulation or πŸ”” harmonisation within the Union.

47. They are

expressly excluded from the scope of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament

and of πŸ”” the Council, ( ) the last indent of Article 1(5)(d) of which provides that the

Directive does not apply to πŸ”” β€˜gambling activities which involve wagering a stake with

monetary value in games of chance, including lotteries and betting transactions’.

48.

Games πŸ”” of chance and gambling are also excluded from the ambit of Directive 2006/123/EC

of the European Parliament and of the πŸ”” Council, ( ) in which the twenty-fifth recital of

the preamble states that β€˜gambling activities, including lottery and betting

transactions, πŸ”” should be excluded … in view of the specific nature of these activities,

which entail implementation by Member States of πŸ”” policies relating to public policy and

consumer protection’.

49. However, a national law which prohibits internet service

providers from offering games πŸ”” of chance and gambling in the territory of a Member State

is likely to fall within the scope of Directive πŸ”” 98/34.

b) Directive 98/34

50. Directive

98/34 aims to remove or reduce barriers to the free movement of goods arising from the

πŸ”” adoption by the Member States of different technical regulations, by promoting the

transparency of national initiatives vis-Γ -vis the Commission, European πŸ”” standardisation

bodies and the other Member States.

51. The ambit of Directive 98/34 was extended by

Directive 98/48 to all services πŸ”” of the information society, that is to say, according

to Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34, any service normally provided for πŸ”” remuneration by

electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services.

52. The term

β€˜technical regulation’ is defined πŸ”” as follows in Article 1(11) of Directive

98/34:

β€˜Technical specifications and other requirements or rules on services, including

the relevant administrative πŸ”” provisions, the observance of which is compulsory, de jure

or de facto, in the case of marketing, provision of a πŸ”” service, establishment of a

service operator or use in a Member State or a major part thereof, as well as πŸ”” laws,

regulations or administrative provisions of Member States, except those provided for in

Article 10, prohibiting the manufacture, importation, marketing πŸ”” or use of a product or

prohibiting the provision or use of a service, or establishment as a service

provider.

…’

53. πŸ”” Therefore Directive 98/34 provides for a system whereby each Member

State must notify the Commission of its proposed technical regulations πŸ”” so as to enable

the Commission and the other Member States to inform it of their viewpoint and to

propose πŸ”” a standardisation which is less restrictive of trade. This system also gives

the Commission the necessary time to propose, if πŸ”” necessary, a binding standardisation

measure.

54. Article 8 of Directive 98/34 reads as follows:

β€˜1. … Member States shall

immediately communicate to πŸ”” the Commission any draft technical regulation, except where

it merely transposes the full text of an international or European standard, πŸ”” in which

case information regarding the relevant standard shall suffice; they shall also let the

Commission have a statement of πŸ”” the grounds which make the enactment of such a technical

regulation necessary, where these have not already been made clear πŸ”” in the draft.

…

The

Commission shall immediately notify the other Member States of the draft and all

documents which have been πŸ”” forwarded to it; it may also refer this draft, for an

opinion, to the Committee referred to in Article 5 πŸ”” and, where appropriate, to the

committee responsible for the field in question.

…

2. The Commission and the Member

States may make πŸ”” comments to the Member State which has forwarded a draft technical

regulation; that Member State shall take such comments into πŸ”” account as far as possible

in the subsequent preparation of the technical regulation.

3. Member States shall

communicate the definitive text πŸ”” of a technical regulation to the Commission without

delay.

…’

55. Article 9 of Directive 98/34 provides as follows:

β€˜1. Member States shall

πŸ”” postpone the adoption of a draft technical regulation for three months from the date of

receipt by the Commission of πŸ”” the communication referred to in Article 8(1).

2. Member

States shall postpone:

…

– without prejudice to paragraphs 4 and 5, for four πŸ”” months the

adoption of any draft rule on services, from the date of receipt by the Commission of

the communication πŸ”” referred to in Article 8(1) if the Commission or another Member State

delivers a detailed opinion, within three months of πŸ”” that date, to the effect that the

measure envisaged may create obstacles to the free movement of services or to πŸ”” the

freedom of establishment of service operators within the internal market.

…

4. Member

States shall postpone the adoption of a draft πŸ”” technical regulation for 12 months from

the date of receipt by the Commission of the communication referred to in Article πŸ”” 8(1)

if, within the three months following that date, the Commission announces its finding

that the draft technical regulation concerns πŸ”” a matter which is covered by a proposal

for a directive, regulation or decision presented to the Council in accordance πŸ”” with

Article 189 of the [EC] Treaty [now Article 249 EC].

…’

2. Primary law and its

interpretation

56. The regulations of the πŸ”” Member States concerning games of chance and

gambling must not interfere with the obligations of the Member States in the πŸ”” context of

the EC Treaty, particularly in relation to the freedoms of movement.

a) The Treaty

57.

The first paragraph of Article πŸ”” 49 EC prohibits restrictions on the freedom to provide

services within the Community in respect of nationals of Member States πŸ”” who are

established in a State of the Community other than that of the person for whom the

services are πŸ”” intended.

58. Under Articles 48 and 55 EC, Article 49 is applicable to the

services offered by a company formed in πŸ”” accordance with the law of a Member State and

having its registered office, central administration or principal place of business

πŸ”” within the Community.

b) Case-law

59. The problem of whether the laws of the Member

States concerning games of chance and gambling πŸ”” are consistent with the fundamental

freedoms of movement have given rise to a relatively large body of case-law, the main

πŸ”” outlines of which may be described as follows.

60. Games of chance and gambling are an

economic activity within the meaning πŸ”” of Article 2 EC. ( ) They consist in the provision

of a particular service, namely the hope of making πŸ”” a cash profit, in return for

remuneration.

61. They are also a service activity which falls within the scope of

Articles πŸ”” 43 and 49 EC concerning the freedom of establishment and the freedom to

provide services. National legislation prohibiting or restricting πŸ”” the right to operate

games of chance and gambling in a Member State may therefore be a restriction of those

πŸ”” freedoms of movement. ( )

62. However, the Court has consistently held that such games

represent a particular economic activity for πŸ”” the following reasons. First, in all the

Member States, moral, religious or cultural considerations tend to restrict, or even

prohibit, πŸ”” such games to prevent them from being a source of private profit. Secondly,

games of chance and gambling involve a πŸ”” high risk of crime or fraud, given the size of

the potential winnings. In addition, they are an encouragement to πŸ”” spend which may have

damaging individual and social consequences. Finally, although this cannot in itself be

regarded as an objective πŸ”” justification, it is not without relevance that lotteries may

make a significant contribution to the financing of benevolent or public πŸ”” interest

activities such as social works, charitable works, sport or culture. ( )

63. Lotteries

organised on a large scale, ( πŸ”” ) gaming machines, ( ) betting on sporting events ( ) and

casino gambling and games ( ) have been πŸ”” considered likely to create a high risk of

crime and fraud because of the considerable sums involved, and also a πŸ”” risk to consumers

because they are an encouragement to spend. ( )

64. The Member States may legitimately

provide for restrictions πŸ”” on the operation of games with those characteristics, on

grounds of consumer protection (limiting the passion of human beings for πŸ”” gaming,

preventing citizens from being tempted to spend excessively on gaming) and defending

the social order (preventing the risks of πŸ”” crime and fraud created by gaming). These are

reasons of overriding general interest which may justify restrictions on the freedoms

πŸ”” of movement. ( )

65. On the other hand, using income from gaming to finance social

activities cannot be a justification πŸ”” as such. The Court bases that assessment on the

principle that the diminution or reduction of tax revenue is not πŸ”” one of the grounds

listed in Article 46 EC and does not constitute a matter of overriding general

interest. ( πŸ”” ) Using the income from gaming in that way is only an incidental beneficial

consequence of a restriction. ( )

66. πŸ”” Determining the necessary degree of protection

for consumers and the maintenance of public order with regard to games of chance πŸ”” and

gambling is a matter for the Member States.

67. According to the Court, the national

authorities must be allowed a πŸ”” sufficient margin of discretion to determine the

requirements entailed by the protection of gamblers and, more generally, taking account

of πŸ”” the social and cultural characteristics of each Member State, the preservation of

public order, with regard to the organisational arrangements πŸ”” of gaming and betting and

the amount of stakes, as well the use made of the profits to which they πŸ”” give rise. ( )

The Member States are therefore free to set the objectives of their policy on betting

and πŸ”” gaming and, where appropriate, to define in detail the degree of protection sought.

( )

68. However, in order to be πŸ”” justified, a national measure restricting a freedom of

movement must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; must be appropriate for

πŸ”” securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues; and must not go beyond what

is necessary in order to πŸ”” attain that objective. ( )

69. In the context of monitoring

compliance with those conditions, the Court has stated on several πŸ”” occasions that the

reasons justifying the restrictions laid down by the measure in question must be

considered together. ( )

70. πŸ”” The Court has accepted that the following restrictions may

be justified.

71. A Member State has the right to prohibit entirely πŸ”” any gaming in its

territory. ( ) According to the Court, it is for those authorities to consider whether,

in πŸ”” the context of the aim pursued, it is necessary to prohibit activities of that kind,

totally or partially, or only πŸ”” to restrict them and to lay down more or less rigorous

procedures for controlling them. ( )

72. A Member State πŸ”” may also grant a single entity

or a limited number of operators an exclusive right to operate gaming and betting. πŸ”” (

)

73. The Court considers that the authorisation by a Member State for the operation of

gaming and betting activities πŸ”” by an entity with an exclusive right or by a specified

number of operators is not incompatible with the aims πŸ”” of protecting consumers from

being tempted to spend excessively and maintaining public order. According to the

Court, limited authorisation of πŸ”” games of chance and gambling on an exclusive basis,

which has the advantage of confining the desire to gamble and πŸ”” the operation of gambling

within controlled channels, of preventing the risk of fraud or crime in the context of

such πŸ”” operation, and of using the resulting profits for public interest purposes,

likewise falls within the ambit of those objectives. ( πŸ”” )

74. In addition, the mere fact

that a Member State has opted for a system of protection which differs from πŸ”” that

adopted by another Member State cannot affect the assessment of the need for, and

proportionality of, the provisions enacted πŸ”” to that end. Those provisions must be

assessed solely by reference to the objectives pursued by the national authorities of

πŸ”” the Member State concerned and the degree of protection which they are intended to

provide. ( )

75. In LÀÀrΓ€ and πŸ”” Others, the Court also examined the question of whether,

to attain the objectives pursued by the Finnish law concerning the πŸ”” operation of gaming

machines, it was preferable, rather than granting an exclusive operating right to the

licensed public body, to πŸ”” adopt regulations imposing the necessary code of conduct on

the operators concerned.

76. The Court stated that that question was a πŸ”” matter to be

assessed by the Member States, subject however to the proviso that the choice made in

that regard πŸ”” must not be disproportionate to the aim pursued. ( ) The Court took the

view that that condition was fulfilled πŸ”” because the body with the exclusive right to

operate the slot machines was a public-law association the activities of which πŸ”” were

carried on under the control of the State and which was required to pay over to the

State the πŸ”” amount of the net distributable proceeds received from the operation of the

slot machines. ( )

77. The Court added that, πŸ”” while it was true that the sums thus

received by the State for public interest purposes could equally be obtained πŸ”” by other

means, such as taxation of the activities of the various operators authorised to pursue

them within the framework πŸ”” of rules of a non-exclusive nature; however, the obligation

imposed on the licensed public body, requiring it to pay over πŸ”” the proceeds of its

operations, constituted a measure which, given the risk of crime and fraud, was

certainly more effective πŸ”” in ensuring that strict limits were set to the lucrative

nature of such activities. ( )

78. In Zenatti, Gambelli and πŸ”” Others, and Placanica and

Others, cited above, the Court spelt out more clearly the conditions which national

legislation must satisfy πŸ”” in order to be justified with particular regard to the Italian

law granting a limited number of organisations fulfilling certain πŸ”” criteria an exclusive

right to organise betting.

79. In Zenatti, the Court observed that the Italian

legislation in question sought to πŸ”” prevent such gaming from being a source of private

profit, to avoid risks of crime and fraud and the damaging πŸ”” individual and social

consequences of the incitement to spend which it represents and to allow it only to the

extent πŸ”” to which it may be socially useful as being conducive to the proper conduct of

competitive sports. ( )

80. The πŸ”” Court stated that such legislation could be justified

only if, from the outset, it reflected a concern to bring about πŸ”” a genuine diminution in

gambling opportunities and if the financing of social activities through a levy on the

proceeds of πŸ”” authorised games constituted only an incidental beneficial consequence and

not the real justification for the restrictive policy adopted. ( ) πŸ”” The Court added that

it was for the national court to verify whether, having regard to the specific rules

governing πŸ”” its application, the national legislation is genuinely directed to realising

the objectives which are capable of justifying it and whether πŸ”” the restrictions which it

imposes do not appear disproportionate in the light of those objectives. ( )

81. In

Gambelli and πŸ”” Others, cited above, the referring court stated that the Italian law on

betting had been amended in 2000 and that πŸ”” the background documents of the amending

measure showed that the Italian Republic was pursuing a policy of substantially

expanding betting πŸ”” and gaming at national level with a view to obtaining funds, while

also protecting existing licensees.

82. The Court stated that πŸ”” restrictions on grounds

of consumer protection and the prevention of both fraud and incitement to squander on

gaming may be πŸ”” justified only if they are appropriate for achieving those objectives,

inasmuch as they must serve to limit betting activities in πŸ”” a consistent and systematic

manner. ( )

83. The Court added that, in so far as the authorities of a Member πŸ”” State

incite and encourage consumers to participate in lotteries, games of chance and betting

to the financial benefit of the πŸ”” public purse, the authorities of that State cannot

invoke public order concerns relating to the need to reduce opportunities for πŸ”” betting

in order to justify measures such as those at issue in the main proceedings. ( )

84. In

view of πŸ”” the aim of avoiding gaming licensees being involved in criminal or fraudulent

activities, the Court found that the Italian legislation πŸ”” on invitations to tender

appeared disproportionate in so far as it prevented capital companies quoted on

regulated markets of other πŸ”” Member States from obtaining licences to organise sporting

bets in Italy. The Court pointed out there were other means of πŸ”” checking the accounts

and activities of such companies. ( )

85. In Placanica and Others, the Court was once

again confronted πŸ”” with the Italian law on betting on sporting events after the Corte

Suprema di Cassazione (Italy) took the view that πŸ”” the law in question was compatible

with Articles 43 and 49 EC. The Italian court found that that the true πŸ”” purpose of the

Italian legislation was not to protect consumers by limiting their propensity to

gamble, but to channel betting πŸ”” and gaming activities into systems that are

controllable, with the objective of preventing their operation for criminal

purposes.

86. The Court πŸ”” stated that, in so far as that was the only aim of the

licensing system laid down by the Italian πŸ”” law, a β€˜policy of controlled expansion’ in

the betting and gaming sector may be entirely consistent with the objective of πŸ”” drawing

players away from clandestine betting and gaming to activities which are authorised and

regulated. According to the Court, in πŸ”” order to achieve that objective, authorised

operators must represent a reliable, but at the same time attractive, alternative to a

πŸ”” prohibited activity, and this may necessitate the offer of an extensive range of games,

advertising on a certain scale and πŸ”” the use of new distribution techniques. ( )

87. As

the facts referred to by the Italian Government showed that clandestine πŸ”” betting and

gaming were a considerable problem in Italy, the Court concluded that a licensing

system may constitute an efficient πŸ”” mechanism enabling operators active in the betting

and gaming sector to be controlled with a view to preventing the operation πŸ”” of those

activities for criminal or fraudulent purposes. ( )

88. However, the Court confirmed

that the law in question appeared πŸ”” disproportionate in that it prevented companies whose

shares are quoted on the regulated markets of other Member States from being πŸ”” able to

obtain licences for the business of sporting betting in Italy. ( )

B – National law

a)

Information provided by πŸ”” the referring court

89. Article 2 of Decree-Law No 282/2003 of

8 November 2003 ( ) grants the Santa Casa the πŸ”” monopoly for the operation by electronic

means of State gambling of a social nature, that is to say, of lotteries πŸ”” and off-course

betting. The monopoly covers the entire national territory, including radioelectric

space, the internet and any other public telecommunications πŸ”” network.

90. Under Article

11(1)(a) and (b) of Decree-Law No 282/2003 the following are illegal:

– the promotion,

organisation or operation by πŸ”” electronic means of State gambling of a social nature

(that is to say, lotteries and off-course betting) in contravention of πŸ”” the monopoly

rules;

– the advertising of those number lotteries, whether they take place in national

territory or not.

2. Additional information πŸ”” provided by the Portuguese Government

91.

In Portugal games of chance and gambling are prohibited in principle. Nevertheless, the

State has πŸ”” reserved the right to authorise, in accordance with the system it deems the

most appropriate, the operation of one or πŸ”” more games, directly or through a body under

its control, or to grant the right to operate games to private πŸ”” entities, whether

non-profit-making or not, by calls for tender.

a) The types of games

92. The Portuguese

legislation distinguishes between three categories πŸ”” of games of chance and gambling,

namely casino games, lotteries, tombolas and publicity competitions, and games of lotto

and betting.

i) πŸ”” Casino games

93. Casino games comprise table games such as roulette and

poker, as well as other types of games such πŸ”” as bingo and slot machines.

94. The

operation of these games is regulated by Decree-law No 422/89 of 2 December 1989, πŸ”” ( )

which was considered by the Court in Anomar and Others.

95. The right to operate casino

games is in πŸ”” principle reserved by the State and it can be exercised only by

undertakings constituted in the form of limited companies πŸ”” licensed by the State, by an

administrative contract. These games are permitted only in casinos in gaming zones

created and πŸ”” defined by legislative measure.

96. There are at present nine casinos of

that type operating in Portugal and licences have recently πŸ”” been granted for four

others.

ii) Lotteries, tombolas and publicity competitions

97. This category of games

comprises lotteries, tombolas, draws, publicity competitions, πŸ”” general knowledge

contests and pastimes. They are subject to prior licensing by the Government, which is

granted case by case πŸ”” on specific conditions.

98. In practice, this category of games

has no commercial impact in Portugal.

iii) Lotto games and betting

99. This πŸ”” category of

games comprises all games in which the contestants predict the results of one or more

contests or draws. πŸ”” These games are known in Portugal as β€˜games of a social nature’ or

β€˜State games of a social nature’.

100. The πŸ”” operation of these games is regulated by

Decree-Law No 84/85 of 28 March 1985. ( )

101. Under Article 1(1) of πŸ”” that Decree-Law,

the right to promote lotto games and betting is reserved by the State, which grants the

Santa Casa πŸ”” the exclusive right to organise and operate them throughout Portugal.

102.

According to the statements in the preambles to the measures πŸ”” providing for this

exclusive right, the Portuguese Government considered that it could no longer overlook

the fact that such gaming πŸ”” was carried on clandestinely, together with the excesses to

which it gave rise. The Government’s purpose was therefore to give πŸ”” it a legal framework

so as to ensure that gaming was fair and to limit its excesses. The Government also

πŸ”” intended that the revenue from gaming, which was morally reprehensible in the culture

of that Member State, should not be πŸ”” a source of private profit, but should serve to

finance social causes or causes of general interest.

103. Originally the Santa πŸ”” Casa

organised contests called β€˜Totobola’ and β€˜Totoloto’. The former covers games in which

the contestants predict the results of one πŸ”” or more sporting events. The latter covers

all games in which the contestants predict the results of drawing numbers by πŸ”” lot .

104.

The range of games was subsequently extended in 1993 to include β€˜Joker’; ( ) in 1994

β€˜Lotaria instantΓ’nia’, πŸ”” an instant game with a scratch card, commonly called

β€˜raspadinha’; ( ) in 1998 β€˜Totogolo’, ( ) and in 2004 πŸ”” β€˜EuromilhΓ΅es’, or European lotto.

( )

105. In 2003 the legal framework of lotto games and betting was adapted to take

πŸ”” account of technical developments enabling the games to be offered by electronic

medium, in particular the internet. These measures appear πŸ”” in Decree-Law 282/2003 and

they aim, in substance, first, to license the Santa Casa to sell its products by

electronic πŸ”” medium and, secondly, to extend the Santa Casa’s exclusive right of

operation to include games offered by electronic medium, in πŸ”” particular the

internet.

106. Article 12(1) of Decree‑Law No 282/2003 sets the maximum and minimum

fines for the administrative offences laid πŸ”” down in Article 11(1)(a) and (b) of that

Decree-Law. For natural persons, the fine is to be not less than πŸ”” EUR 2 000 or more than

three times the total amount deemed to have been collected from organising the game,

πŸ”” provided that the triple figure is greater than EUR 2 000 but does not exceed a maximum

of EUR 44 πŸ”” 890.

b) The regulations of the Santa Casa

107. The Santa Casa is a social

solidarity institution established on 15 August 1498. πŸ”” It has always been devoted to

charitable work for assisting the most disadvantaged.

108. In Portugal, State games of

a social πŸ”” nature are assigned to the Santa Casa. The β€˜Lotaria Nacional’ (national

lottery), established by a royal edict of 18 November πŸ”” 1783, was contracted out to that

institution and the contract was renewed regularly. In 1961 the Santa Casa was granted

πŸ”” the exclusive right to organise other forms of lotto games and betting such as Totobola

and, in 1985, Totoloto.

109. The πŸ”” activities of the Santa Casa are regulated by

Decree-Law No 322/91 of 26 August 1991. ( )

110. According to its πŸ”” statutes, the Santa

Casa is a β€˜legal person in the public administrative interest’, that is to say, a

private legal πŸ”” person, recognised by the authorities as pursuing non-profit-making

objects of general interest.

111. The administrative organs of the Santa Casa consist

πŸ”” of a director, appointed by decree of the Prime Minister, and a board of management

whose members are appointed by πŸ”” decrees of the members of the Government under whose

supervision the Santa Casa falls.

112. The operation of games of chance πŸ”” falls within

the responsibilities of the Gaming Department of the Santa Casa, which has its own

administrative and control organs.

113. πŸ”” The administrative organ of the Gaming

Department consists of the director of the Santa Casa, who is the ex officio πŸ”” chairman,

and two deputy directors appointed by joint decree of the Minister of Employment and

Solidarity and the Minister of πŸ”” Health.

114. Each type of game of chance organised by

the Santa Casa is instituted separately by a decree-law and the πŸ”” entire organisation and

operation of the game, including the amount of stakes, the system for awarding prizes,

the frequency of πŸ”” draws, the specific percentage of each prize, methods of collecting

stakes, the method of selecting authorised distributors, the methods and πŸ”” periods for

payment of prizes, are governed by government regulation.

115. The members of the

competition committee, the draw committee and πŸ”” the claims committee are mostly

representatives of the public authorities. The chairman of the claims committee, who

has a casting πŸ”” vote, is a judge.

116. The Gaming Department has a budget and its own

accounts which are annexed to the budget πŸ”” and the accounts of the Santa Casa, and as

such are under government supervision.

117. The Gaming Department has administrative

authority πŸ”” powers to open and organise proceedings concerning offences of illegal

operation of games of chance in relation to which the πŸ”” Santa Casa has the exclusive

rights, and to investigate such offences.

118. Article 14 of Decree-Law No 282/2003

confers upon the πŸ”” Gaming Department the necessary administrative powers to impose fines

such as those imposed on the Liga and Baw.

119. An appeal πŸ”” may be lodged against any

decision of the Gaming Department in contravention cases and any other decision with

effect outside πŸ”” the Gaming Department, such as decisions concerning the purchase of

goods and services and the grant of authorisation to third πŸ”” parties to sell tickets for

games of a social nature.

120. The Santa Casa has specific tasks in the areas of

πŸ”” protection of the family, mothers and children, help for unprotected minors at risk,

assistance for old people, social situations of πŸ”” serious deprivation and primary and

specialised health care.

121. Under the law in force at the material time, the Santa

Casa πŸ”” retains only 25% of the earnings from the various games. The balance is shared

among other public-interest institutions such as πŸ”” associations of voluntary firemen,

private social solidarity institutions, establishments for the safety and

rehabilitation of handicapped persons, the cultural development πŸ”” fund or social

projects. Accordingly 50% of the earnings from Totobola go towards the promotion and

development of football and πŸ”” 16% of the earnings from Totoloto serve to finance sports

activities.

III – The main proceedings and the question referred

122. The πŸ”” Liga is a

private-law legal person with the structure of a non‑profit‑making association. It

brings together all the clubs taking πŸ”” part in football competitions at professional

level in Portugal. It is responsible for the commercial operation of the competitions

it πŸ”” organises.

123. Bwin is an on-line gaming undertaking with registered office in

Gibraltar. It offers games of chance on its Portuguese-language πŸ”” website. It is governed

by the special legislation of Gibraltar on the regulation of games of chance and has

obtained πŸ”” all the requisite licences from the Government of Gibraltar. Bwin has no

establishment in Portugal. Its servers for the on-line πŸ”” service are in Gibraltar and

Austria. All bets are placed directly by the consumer on Bwin’s website or by some

πŸ”” other means of direct communication.

124. Bwin offers a wide range of on-line games of

chance covering sporting bets, lotto and πŸ”” casino games such as roulette and poker.

Betting is on the results of football matches and other sports such as πŸ”” rugby, formula 1

motor racing and American basketball.

125. The referring court states that the Liga and

Bwin are charged with πŸ”” the following offences:

– concluding a sponsorship agreement for

four playing seasons starting in 2005/2006, under which Bwin is the institutional

πŸ”” sponsor of the First National Football Division, previously known as the β€˜Super Liga’,

which is now called β€˜Liga betandwin’;

– under πŸ”” that agreement, Bwin acquired rights

allowing it to display the logo β€˜betandwin’ on the sports kit worn by the players πŸ”” of

the clubs whose teams take part in the Super Liga championship and to affix the logo

β€˜betandwin’ in the πŸ”” stadiums of those clubs; in addition, the Liga’s internet site began

to include a reference and a link enabling access πŸ”” to Bwin’s website;

– the Bwin site

makes it possible to place sporting bets electronically, whereby the participants

predict the result πŸ”” of football matches taking place each day in the Super Liga, and of

football matches abroad, in order to win πŸ”” money prizes; the same site also makes it

possible to play lottery games electronically, in which the participants predict the

πŸ”” results of drawing numbers by lot.

126. The directors of the Gaming Department of the

Santa Casa fined the Liga and πŸ”” Bwin EUR 75 000 and EUR 74 500 respectively for

promoting, organising and operating electronically, as accomplices, State gaming of πŸ”” a

social nature, that is to say, off-course betting, and for advertising such gaming

electronically, contrary to the monopoly provided πŸ”” for by national law.

127. The Liga

and Bwin brought an action for the annulment of those decisions on the basis πŸ”” of

Community rules and case-law.

128. The Tribunal de Pequena InstΓ’ncia Criminal do Porto

(Portugal) decided to stay the proceedings and πŸ”” to refer the following question to the

Court for a preliminary ruling:

β€˜In essence, the question is whether the monopoly

granted πŸ”” to the Santa Casa, when relied on against [Bwin], that is to say, against a

provider of services established in πŸ”” another Member State in which it lawfully provides

similar services, which has no physical establishment in Portugal, constitutes an

impediment πŸ”” to the free provision of services, in breach of the principles of freedom to

provide services, freedom of establishment and πŸ”” the free movement of payments enshrined

in Articles 49 [EC], 43 [EC] and 56 [EC].

This court seeks therefore to know πŸ”” whether it

is contrary to Community law, in particular to the abovementioned principles, for rules

of domestic law such as πŸ”” those at issue in the main proceedings first to establish a

monopoly in favour of a single body for the πŸ”” operation of lotteries and off-course

betting and then to extend that monopoly to β€œthe entire national territory, including …

the πŸ”” internet”.’

IV – Analysis

A – Admissibility of the question referred

129. The

question from the national court seeks to establish whether its πŸ”” national law, whereby

the exclusive right conferred on a single non-profit-making entity controlled by the

State to organise and operate πŸ”” lotteries and off-course betting in the whole of

Portuguese territory is extended to all electronic means of communication, in

particular πŸ”” the internet, is compatible with Community law.

130. The Italian,

Netherlands and Norwegian Governments and the Commission dispute or question the

πŸ”” admissibility of the question on the ground that the order for reference does not

provide sufficient information on the nature πŸ”” and the aims of the Portuguese legislation

applicable to the main proceedings.

131. I do not think the question can be πŸ”” ruled

inadmissible.

132. The national court’s description of its national legislation makes

it clear that it, first, grants the Santa Casa πŸ”” an exclusive right to organise and

operate lotteries and off-course betting on the internet and, second, provides for

penalties for πŸ”” operators who disregard that monopoly. Likewise, the account of the facts

describes the issue in the main proceedings. Furthermore, the πŸ”” order for reference shows

that the national court is uncertain as to whether the Portuguese legislation is

compatible with Community πŸ”” law in so far as the former prevents an operator legally

pursuing its activities in a Member State of the πŸ”” European Union from providing services

in Portugal.

133. No doubt, in the light of the criteria developed in the Court’s

case-law πŸ”” on the basis of which the compatibility with Community law of a national

measure concerning games of chance and betting πŸ”” must be assessed, I could have expected

the national court to give a fuller account of its domestic law and πŸ”” the implementation

thereof, with regard to the Santa Casa’s monopoly, together with the reasons why the

monopoly has been extended πŸ”” to games of chance and gambling on the internet. It would

also have been desirable for the national court to πŸ”” state the reasons why the Court’s

previous judgments did not answer those questions and did not enable the national court

πŸ”” to give judgment in the main proceedings.

134. However, the lack of information in the

order for reference does not justify πŸ”” dismissing the question as inadmissible.

135. The

question concerns the interpretation of Community law as it is necessary to interpret

the πŸ”” articles of the Treaty establishing the freedoms of movement. The question is

relevant to the outcome of the main proceedings πŸ”” because, if the relevant freedom of

movement were interpreted by the Court as meaning that it precludes the grant of

πŸ”” exclusive rights of that kind, the action brought by the Liga and Bwin would have to be

ruled well-founded.

136. Finally, πŸ”” the information provided by the national court is

sufficient to enable the Court to give a helpful reply, at least πŸ”” to the question

whether the grant of exclusive rights to a single entity in relation to the

organisation and operation πŸ”” of games of chance and gambling on the internet is, in

principle or necessarily, contrary to Community law.

137. According to πŸ”” settled

case-law, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been

brought, and which must assume πŸ”” responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to

determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the πŸ”” need for a

preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the

questions which πŸ”” it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted

concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice πŸ”” is, in principle,

bound to give a ruling. ( )

138. It is true that the Court has also held that, πŸ”” in

exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred

to it by the national court πŸ”” It is regularly observed in judgments giving preliminary

rulings that β€˜the spirit of cooperation which must prevail in [such] proceedings

πŸ”” requires the national court for its part to have regard to the function entrusted to

the Court of Justice, which πŸ”” is to contribute to the administration of justice in the

Member States and not to give opinions on general or πŸ”” hypothetical questions’. ( )

139.

Accordingly, the Court has held that it has no jurisdiction to give a preliminary

ruling on πŸ”” a question submitted by a national court where it is quite obvious that the

interpretation or the assessment of the πŸ”” validity of a provision of Community law sought

by that court bears no relation to the actual facts of the πŸ”” main action or its purpose,

or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary πŸ”” to

give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it. ( )

140. The question at present

before the Court πŸ”” does not fall within any of those cases.

141. I also wish to point out

that, in spite of the lack πŸ”” of information from the national court concerning the nature

and the purpose of its national law, nine Member States other πŸ”” than the Portuguese

Republic have been able to submit written observations, in addition to the latter, the

parties to the πŸ”” main proceedings and the Commission.

142. It transpires, however, that

the Liga and Bwin, as well as the interveners, in particular πŸ”” the Portuguese Government,

have set out in detail the substance and the aims of the legislation in question and

that πŸ”” these matters were discussed at length in the oral procedure. Therefore the Court

could go further than examining only the πŸ”” question whether a national measure granting a

single entity the exclusive right to offer off-course betting on the internet is πŸ”” in

principle compatible with Community law.

143. The Italian Government also argues that

the question referred is inadmissible on the ground πŸ”” that the national court is

requesting the Court of Justice to give a ruling on the compatibility of its domestic

πŸ”” law with Community law.

144. No doubt, as the Italian Government says, and in

accordance with settled case-law, in accordance with πŸ”” the division of responsibilities

under the cooperative arrangements established by Article 234 EC, the interpretation of

provisions of national law πŸ”” is a matter for the national courts, not for the Court of

Justice, and the Court has no jurisdiction, in πŸ”” proceedings brought on the basis of that

article, to rule on the compatibility of national rules with Community law. ( πŸ”” )

145.

However, even if the question referred has to be construed in the way suggested by the

Italian Government, it πŸ”” would still not be inadmissible. Where the Court is expressly

questioned on the compatibility of a national provision with Community πŸ”” law, the Court

rewords the question in accordance with its powers and points out that it does have

jurisdiction to πŸ”” provide the national court with all the guidance as to the

interpretation of Community law necessary to enable that court πŸ”” to rule on the

compatibility of those national rules with Community law. ( )

146. I therefore propose

that the Court πŸ”” should find that the question from the national court is admissible.

B –

Substance of the case

147. According to the information πŸ”” from the national court, the

provisions of Article 11(1)(a) and (b) of Decree-Law No 282/2003 prohibit, first, the

organisation and πŸ”” operation of lotteries and off-course betting on the internet,

contrary to the exclusive right conferred upon the Santa Casa and, πŸ”” second, advertising

them on line, contrary to that right.

148. It is also clear that the Liga and Bwin were

fined πŸ”” EUR 75 000 and EUR 74 500 respectively for, first, organising and operating

off-course betting on the internet, contrary to πŸ”” the Santa Casa’s exclusive right, and,

second, advertising such betting.

149. Consequently it seems to me that the

compatibility of the πŸ”” national law in question with Community law must be assessed by

reference to two sets of provisions. First, in so πŸ”” far as it confers upon the Santa Casa

an exclusive right to offer lotteries and betting on the internet and πŸ”” prevents any

other service provider established within the Union from offering such services on line

in Portugal, the legislation in πŸ”” question may be covered by Directive 98/34. Second, in

so far as it prohibits all advertising for lotteries and off-course πŸ”” betting organised

contrary to the Santa Casa’s exclusive right, such legislation may fall within the

ambit of Article 49 EC.

1. πŸ”” Application of Directive 98/34

150. It is necessary to

determine whether Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34 must be interpreted as meaning πŸ”” that

a national measure whereby the exclusive right to organise and operate lotteries and

off-course betting in the whole of πŸ”” national territory is extended to all electronic

means of communication, in particular the internet, is a technical rule within the

πŸ”” meaning of that provision.

151. In its written observations, the Commission argued that

the legislation in question was within the ambit πŸ”” of Directive 98/34.

152. The

interveners, which were asked state their position on that point in the oral procedure,

took different πŸ”” positions. The Liga and Bwin agree with the Commission’s analysis.

153.

The Portuguese Government points out that Directive 93/84 was not πŸ”” relied upon by the

Liga and Bwin in the context of the main proceedings and that the national court raised

πŸ”” no question concerning the directive. The Government adds that it is for the national

court to ascertain the Community law πŸ”” applicable to the dispute which is to be

determined and concludes that the Directive is not relevant in the present πŸ”” case.

154.

In the alternative, the Portuguese Government claims that Directive 98/34 did not

require Portugal to notify the Commission of πŸ”” the legislation in question. The

Government notes that games of chance and gambling were excluded from the ambit of

Directive πŸ”” 2000/31 on electronic commerce and Directive 2006/123 on services in the

internal market.

155. The Danish Government, supported by the Greek πŸ”” Government, takes

the same view as the Portuguese Government. In addition, it states that the disputed

legislation, which prohibits the πŸ”” operation of a certain activity in the territory of a

State, is similar to national law which makes an occupational πŸ”” activity conditional on

the grant of authorisation and that, according to the case-law, such legislation does

not constitute a technical πŸ”” regulation. The Danish Government submits that that term is

interpreted by the case-law as meaning specifications defining the characteristics of

πŸ”” products. ( )

156. The Greek Government also considers that a national law providing

for a State monopoly of games of πŸ”” chance and gambling does not fall within the scope of

Directive 98/34.

157. I do not agree with the position of πŸ”” those governments. First of

all, I shall show that it is open to the Court to interpret the provisions of πŸ”” Directive

98/34 although the national court’s question does not relate to it. Next, I shall set

out the reasons why, πŸ”” in my view, the disputed legislation falls within the scope of the

Directive. I shall also describe the consequences of πŸ”” failure to give notice of such

legislation. Finally, in view of the Member States’ observations on the relevance of

Directive πŸ”” 98/34 for the outcome of the main proceedings, it seems to me useful to

mention that the judgment to be πŸ”” given binds the national court with regard, inter alia,

to the interpretation of the Directive, as the case may be.

a) πŸ”” The Court’s opportunity

to interpret Directive 98/34, although the national court does not refer to it

158. The

fact that the πŸ”” Court may interpret Directive 98/34 although the national court has not

submitted a question on it is clear from settled πŸ”” case-law. Where the Court considers

that the national court has not questioned it on the provision of Community law

applicable πŸ”” in the main proceedings, it examines of its own motion the meaning of that

provision. Accordingly, as has often been πŸ”” said, in order to provide a satisfactory

answer to the national court which has referred a question to it, the πŸ”” Court of Justice

may deem it necessary to consider provisions of Community law to which the national

court has not πŸ”” referred in its question. ( )

159. It follows that where, as in the

present case, the national court has questioned πŸ”” the Court on the meaning of the Treaty

articles establishing the freedoms of movement, the Court may reply by interpreting πŸ”” a

directive which specially regulates the facts of the main proceedings. ( )

b) The

contested provisions fall within the scope πŸ”” of Directive 98/34

160. Contrary to the

Member States which have stated their position on this question, I am of the πŸ”” opinion,

like the Liga and Bwin as well as the Commission, that the contested provisions are

β€˜technical regulations’ within the πŸ”” meaning of Directive 98/34 in so far as they

prohibit any other operator from offering lotteries and off-course betting on πŸ”” the

internet in Portugal.

161. I base my position on, first, the definitions of β€˜service’

and β€˜technical regulation’ in the directive.

162. πŸ”” Thus an β€˜Information Society

service’, within the meaning of Article 1, point 2, of Directive 98/34, is any service

normally πŸ”” provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the

individual request of a recipient of services. However, πŸ”” it is clear from the nineteenth

recital of the preamble to the directive that it is also necessary to refer πŸ”” to the

definition of β€˜services’ in Article 50 EC, as interpreted in the Court’s case-law.

163.

As we have already seen, πŸ”” the case-law shows that a provider established in one Member

State who offers by internet, without moving from that State, πŸ”” games on line to

recipients established in another Member State provides services within the meaning of

Article 50 EC. ( πŸ”” )

164. Next, Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34 expressly states that

the term β€˜technical regulation’ covers rules prohibiting the provision or πŸ”” use of a

service. Therefore, contrary to the position adopted by several Member States, since

the ambit of Directive 98/34 πŸ”” was extended to Information Society services, β€˜technical

regulation’ has not been confined to specifications defining the characteristics of

products, as πŸ”” was the case under Directive 83/189/EEC, ( ) as interpreted in the

judgments cited above, CIA Security International, ( )van πŸ”” der Burg, ( ) and Canal

SatΓ©lite Digital, ( ) to which those States refer.

165. The contested provisions, which

give πŸ”” the Santa Casa an exclusive right to organise and operate lotteries and off-course

betting on the internet in the whole πŸ”” of Portugal and which lay down penalties for any

operator which disregards that exclusive right, does have the effect of πŸ”” prohibiting a

provider of games on the internet from providing its services.

166. Having regard to

the abovementioned definitions, the provisions πŸ”” in question constitute a β€˜technical

regulation’ within the meaning of Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34.

167. In the second

place, this πŸ”” conclusion seems to me to accord with the reasons why the ambit of the

directive was extended to Information Society πŸ”” services.

168. It is clear from the

preamble to Directive 98/48 that the Community legislature aimed to extend to specific

services πŸ”” of that kind the system of transparency and supervision originally provided

for in relation only to goods, so as to πŸ”” avoid the barriers to the free movement of such

services which could be caused by national regulations.

169. The application of πŸ”” the

mandatory notification system provided for by Directive 98/34 to such regulations does

not mean that they are contrary to πŸ”” Community law.

170. As we have seen, Directive 98/34

aims only to establish a system of preventive control. First, by requiring πŸ”” Member

States to notify the Commission of any draft technical regulation, the Community

legislature asks them to carry out a πŸ”” prior detailed check of its conformity with

Community law. Consequently the directive has the effect of making it clear that, πŸ”” if

the proposed regulation impedes the free movement of goods or the freedom to provide

Information Society services, the Member πŸ”” State must be able to justify it in conformity

with the conditions laid down by the case-law.

171. The notification system πŸ”” provided

for by Directive 98/34 then enables the Commission and the other Member States to

examine the draft regulation to πŸ”” see whether it creates barriers. If so, the other

Member States may propose that the author of the draft should πŸ”” amend it. The Commission

for its part may propose or adopt joint measures regulating the topic which is the

subject πŸ”” of the proposed measure.

172. Such a system reconciles the sovereign power of

the Member States to adopt technical regulations in πŸ”” fields where they have not been

harmonised with the obligation they have undertaken to each other in the Treaty to

πŸ”” establish a common market, that is to say, a space within which goods and services in

particular circulate freely.

173. It πŸ”” follows that Directive 98/34 is really effective

only if all technical regulations are notified, ( ) including those relating to πŸ”” games

of chance and gambling, because these constitute an economic activity and are covered

by the freedom of establishment and πŸ”” the freedom to provide services.

174. In addition,

we find that, where the Community legislature wished to exclude games of chance πŸ”” and

gambling from a measure relating to services, such as Directive 2000/31 on electronic

commerce and Directive 2006/123 on services πŸ”” in the internal market, it provided for

such exclusion expressly. However, Directive 98/34 contains no provision excluding

technical regulations concerning πŸ”” games of chance and gambling from its ambit.

175. In

the third place, this reasoning seems to be in conformity with πŸ”” the Court’s position in

Commission v Greece, concerning the Greek law prohibiting the use of games on computers

in undertakings πŸ”” providing internet services. The Court found that such measures must be

considered to be β€˜technical regulations’ within the meaning of πŸ”” Article 1(11) of

Directive 98/34. ( )

176. In the abovementioned judgment the Court found that a measure

of a Member πŸ”” State such as that in issue in the main proceedings, which prohibits access

to internet games, concerns access to or πŸ”” the provision of Information Society services

and is therefore within the ambit of Directive 98/34.

177. Consequently I propose that

the πŸ”” Court’s reply to the national court should be that Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34

must be interpreted as meaning that πŸ”” a measure of a Member State whereby an exclusive

right to organise and operate lotteries and off-course betting in the πŸ”” entire territory

of that State is extended to all means of electronic communication, in particular the

internet, constitutes a β€˜technical πŸ”” regulation’ within the meaning of that provision. (

)

c) The consequences of failing to give notice of the contested measures

178. πŸ”” Article

8(1) of Directive 98/34 requires the Member States to notify the Commission of any

draft technical regulation. ( ) πŸ”” Article 9 requires them to postpone the adoption of any

such regulation for such period as the Commission may determine.

179. πŸ”” According to

those provisions, the draft Decree-Law No 282/2003 which, first, extends the Santa

Casa’s exclusive right to operate games πŸ”” offered by electronic medium, in particular the

internet, and, secondly, provides for administrative fines on operators who infringe

that right, πŸ”” ought to have been notified to the Commission.

180. In its written

observations, the Commission stated that it was not notified πŸ”” of the draft Decree-Law.

The Portuguese Government confirmed that it had not notified the Commission.

181. In

CIA Security International, the πŸ”” Court described the consequences of failure to notify

the Commission. The Court took the view that the obligations of notification πŸ”” and

postponement laid down in Articles 8 and 9 of Directive 83/189 are unconditional and

sufficiently precise to be relied πŸ”” on by individuals before national courts. ( ) A

technical regulation which has not been notified is therefore inapplicable to

πŸ”” individuals and national courts must decline to apply it. ( )

182. That case-law can be

applied to Articles 8 and πŸ”” 9 of Directive 98/34 as they in similar terms to those of

Directive 83/189.

183. As Directive 98/34 aims in particular πŸ”” to protect the freedom to

provide Information Society services, an operator such as Bwin, established in

Gibraltar, has a right πŸ”” to avail itself of those precise and unconditional

provisions.

184. Gibraltar is a European territory for whose external relations the

United πŸ”” Kingdom is responsible. Consequently the Treaty provisions are applicable to it

in accordance with Article 299(4) EC, subject to the πŸ”” exclusions provided for in the Act

concerning the conditions of accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom and

the πŸ”” adjustments to the treaties. ( )

185. The Court has concluded from the Act that the

Treaty rules on free movement πŸ”” of goods and the rules of secondary Community legislation

intended, as regards free circulation of goods, to ensure approximation of πŸ”” the laws of

the Member States, do not apply to Gibraltar. ( )

186. However, those exclusions must,

in my view, πŸ”” be deemed exceptions to the principle laid down in Article 299(4) EC that

the provisions of the Treaty apply to πŸ”” a European territory such as Gibraltar. Therefore

the Treaty provisions on the freedom to provide services and the secondary legislation

πŸ”” adopted to ensure the establishment of that freedom apply to Gibraltar. To prove this,

I wish to cite the judgments πŸ”” in actions brought by the Commission against the United

Kingdom for failing to implement such directives on its territory. ( πŸ”” )

187. I conclude

from this that an operator such as Bwin, established in Gibraltar, has a right to plead

Articles πŸ”” 8 and 9 of Directive 98/34 in so far as they relate to technical regulations

concerning Information Society services.

188. The πŸ”” fact that the provisions in question

are included in a measure which also relates to the free movement of goods πŸ”” does not

seem to me inconsistent with that conclusion. A technical regulation may be clearly

connected with the free movement πŸ”” of goods or the freedom to provide Information Society

services on the basis of the delimitation of the respective fields πŸ”” to which those

freedoms apply, as defined by the Court.

189. In conformity with the position taken by

the Court in πŸ”” CIA Security International, if the Commission was not duly notified of the

national provisions in question, in so far as, πŸ”” first, they grant the Santa Casa an

exclusive right to organise and operate lotteries and off-course betting on the

internet πŸ”” and, second, they provide for administrative fines on providers of services

who, in breach of that right, offer internet games πŸ”” to persons residing in Portugal,

those national provisions are not applicable as against Bwin and the national court

must decline πŸ”” to apply them.

190. This conclusion should also apply to the Liga, which

was fined as Bwin’s accomplice for organising and πŸ”” operating off-course betting by

electronic means.

191. The national court, which alone has jurisdiction to establish

the facts in the main πŸ”” proceedings, will have to determine whether the draft Decree-Law

282/2003 which aims, in substance, to extend the Santa Casa’s exclusive πŸ”” right to

operate games offered by electronic media, in particular the internet, and to impose a

penalty in the form πŸ”” of a fine for infringing that exclusive right, was notified to the

Commission in accordance with Article 8 of Directive πŸ”” 98/34.

192. The national court

will also have to draw the appropriate conclusions with regard to the fines imposed on

the πŸ”” Liga and Bwin as the fines relate to the organisation and operation of off-course

betting on the internet, in breach πŸ”” of the Santa Casa’s exclusive right.

d) The effects

of the Court’s judgment for the referring court

193. The replies given by πŸ”” several

Member States in the course of the hearing to the question concerning the relevance of

Directive 98/34 to the πŸ”” outcome of the main proceedings could be understood as meaning

that the judgment which will give a preliminary ruling would πŸ”” not, according to those

States, be binding on the referring court in so far as it relates to the interpretation

πŸ”” of the abovementioned directive.

194. I take the opposite view. Judgments giving a

preliminary ruling are binding on the referring court πŸ”” even where the Court of Justice

rules on a Community-law measure to which the question from the national court does πŸ”” not

refer.

195. I base this conclusion on, first, the relationship between Community law

and national law and, secondly, the function πŸ”” of the preliminary ruling procedure.

196.

On the first point, as the Court observed in van Gend en Loos ( ) πŸ”” and Costa ( ) by

signing and ratifying the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the

Member States agreed that πŸ”” the Treaty and the measures adopted on the basis thereof

should form part of their national law, should take precedence πŸ”” to any contrary national

rule, whatever it may be, and should be intended to create rights directly in favour of

πŸ”” individuals.

197. They also undertook to take all appropriate measures to ensure the

effective application of Community law and that obligation πŸ”” must be accepted by their

judicial authorities. Consequently national courts have an obligation to maintain the

rights conferred by measures πŸ”” of the Community legal order.

198. The national courts

must of their own motion refuse to apply any provision of national πŸ”” legislation

conflicting with directly applicable Community law, without having to request or await

the prior setting-aside of such legislation in πŸ”” the internal system. ( ) If a Community

measure is not directly applicable, the national court must interpret the whole πŸ”” of its

national law so far as possible so as to achieve the result intended by that measure,

in accordance πŸ”” with the requirement of interpretation in conformity with Community law.

( )

199. Therefore the national court’s task is to ensure πŸ”” the effective application of

Community law.

200. It is true that the national court discharges those obligations in

conformity with its πŸ”” domestic rules of procedure, in accordance with the principle of

procedural autonomy, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness πŸ”” by

virtue of which, first, those rules must not be less favourable than those applicable

to maintain the rights conferred πŸ”” by domestic law and, second, they must not be framed

in such a way as to render impossible in practice πŸ”” or excessively difficult the exercise

of rights conferred by Community law. ( )

201. Where, in the context of a dispute

πŸ”” before a national court, the parties have not invoked the relevant Community rule, it

may happen that that rule is πŸ”” not applied, as the Court’s case-law concerning the

significance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness stands at present.

202.

According πŸ”” to the Court’s case-law, a national court must raise of its own motion the

relevant point of Community law where, πŸ”” under national law, it must or may do so in

relation to a binding rule of national law. ( ) πŸ”” On the other hand, it is not obliged to

do so where it has no such obligation or option under πŸ”” national law and where the

parties were given a genuine opportunity to raise a plea based on Community law in πŸ”” the

course of the proceedings. ( ) Furthermore, national courts are not required to raise

of their own motion a πŸ”” plea alleging infringement of Community provisions where

examination of that plea would oblige them to go beyond the ambit of πŸ”” the dispute as

defined by the parties. ( )

203. However, those limits to the application of Community

law cannot be πŸ”” transposed where the Court, in the context of preliminary ruling

proceedings, examines of its own motion the rule applicable to πŸ”” the facts of the main

proceedings.

204. The object of the preliminary ruling procedure is to secure the

uniform interpretation of πŸ”” Community law by national courts and tribunals. ( ) Uniform

interpretation can be secured only if the Court’s judgments are πŸ”” binding on national

courts. As the Court observed in Benedetti, ( ) a preliminary ruling is binding on the

national πŸ”” court as to the interpretation of the Community provisions and acts in

question.

205. The binding nature of the ruling is πŸ”” also the corollary of the national

courts’ obligation to ensure the effective application of Community law.

206. This

reasoning is confirmed πŸ”” by the third paragraph of Article 234 EC, which states that a

reference for a preliminary ruling is mandatory where πŸ”” a question on the interpretation

of Community law arises before a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no

πŸ”” judicial remedy under national law. In order to prevent Community law from being

infringed, a court against whose decisions there πŸ”” is no judicial remedy under national

law, which is by nature the last judicial body before which individuals may assert πŸ”” the

rights conferred on them by Community law, is required to make a reference to the Court

of Justice. ( πŸ”” )

207. This reasoning is supported by the judgment in a case where it was

held that a manifest infringement of πŸ”” Community law by a court adjudicating at last

instance was likely to give rise to liability on the part of πŸ”” the State, ( ) and also

where an action for failure to fulfil obligations could be brought against a Member

πŸ”” State by reason of a national judicial interpretation contrary to Community law, where

that interpretation is confirmed or not disowned πŸ”” by the supreme court. ( )

208.

Consequently the object of the preliminary ruling procedure itself is to ensure the

effective πŸ”” application of Community law. That is why, contrary to the submissions of the

Portuguese Government, the Court cannot be bound πŸ”” by the national court’s assessment

with regard to the Community provisions applicable to the facts of the main

proceedings. The πŸ”” Court’s task is to give the national court a reply which is of help to

the outcome of the dispute πŸ”” which it must determine, that is to say, which enables it to

perform its function of ensuring the effective application πŸ”” of Community law.

209. In

addition, the Court’s examination of a point of Community law of its own motion which

was πŸ”” not raised by the national court would be of little use if the preliminary ruling,

in so far it related πŸ”” to that point, were not binding on that court.

210. The fact that

the parties to the main proceedings did not πŸ”” refer, before the national court, to the

provision of Community law examined by the Court of its own motion is πŸ”” not an obstacle

to the binding effect of the preliminary ruling in so far as the parties had an

opportunity πŸ”” to make their observations on that provision known in the course of the

preliminary ruling procedure. It must be observed πŸ”” that, in the present case, the

parties were asked by the Court, prior to the hearing, to submit in the πŸ”” course of the

hearing their observations on the relevance of Directive 98/34 to the outcome of the

main proceedings.

211. It πŸ”” follows that preliminary rulings are, in my opinion,

necessarily binding where the Court interprets a provision of Community law to πŸ”” which

the national court has not referred.

212. Consequently I propose that the Court’s reply

to the national court should, in πŸ”” addition, rule that a preliminary ruling binds the

referring court even in so far as the ruling relates to a πŸ”” provision of Community law

that was not referred to in the national court’s question.

2. The compatibility of the

national legislation πŸ”” in issue with the freedoms of movement

213. Even if the Court

concurs with my reasoning concerning the relevance of Directive πŸ”” 98/34 to the present

case and the consequences of failure to notify the Commission, an examination of the

compatibility of πŸ”” the national law in question with the freedoms of movement, in so far

as it prohibits advertising of on-line games πŸ”” organised and operated in breach of the

Santa Casa’s exclusive right, does not appear to be manifestly irrelevant to the

πŸ”” outcome of the main proceedings.

214. It is for the national court to determine whether

the fact that Decree-Law No 282/2003, πŸ”” in so far as it grants the Santa Casa an

exclusive right to organise and operate lotteries and off-course betting πŸ”” on the

internet, is unenforceable as against the Liga and Bwin, must lead to setting aside the

whole of the πŸ”” single fine imposed on each of them or whether the amount of the fine

should be divided between what is πŸ”” due on account of organising on-line games and what

is due on account of advertising them.

215. The question therefore is πŸ”” whether a

national measure prohibiting advertising for on-line games organised and operated in

breach of an exclusive right conferred on πŸ”” a single non‑profit‑making entity, is

inconsistent with the freedom to provide services.

216. To reply to that question, it

would certainly πŸ”” appear to be helpful to consider the question from the referring court

as to whether its national legislation granting the πŸ”” Santa Casa an exclusive right to

organise and operate in Portugal lotteries off‑course betting on the internet is

compatible with πŸ”” the freedoms of movement. If that exclusive right is consistent with

Community law, the question whether the prohibition of advertising πŸ”” lotteries and

off-course betting organised and operated in breach of that right is compatible with

Community law no longer arises.

217. πŸ”” The national court’s question seeks to establish

whether its national legislation which provides that the Santa Casa’s exclusive right

to πŸ”” organise and operate lotteries and off-course betting in the entire State territory

is extended to all means of electronic communication, πŸ”” in particular the internet, is

inconsistent with Community law and, in particular, the freedom to provide services,

the freedom of πŸ”” establishment and the free movement of capital and payments, as laid

down in Articles 43 EC, 49 EC and 56 πŸ”” EC.

218. At this stage of the discussion, it could

be asked whether the freedoms of movement are relevant to the πŸ”” main proceedings in view

of the fact that the Santa Casa has been granted a monopoly of the operation of

πŸ”” lotteries and off-course betting on the internet on grounds of consumer protection and

safeguarding public order against the adverse effect πŸ”” of such gaming. A national

monopoly based on such grounds could be regarded as pursuing a public interest aim. (

πŸ”” )

219. It could therefore have been asked whether the Santa Casa could avail itself of

Article 86(2) EC, which states πŸ”” that undertakings entrusted with the operation of

services of general economic interest are to be subject to the rules of πŸ”” the Treaty in

so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in

πŸ”” fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them.

220. However, neither the referring

court nor the Portuguese Government have mentioned those πŸ”” provisions. Assuming that they

had done so, I do not think an examination of the present case from the viewpoint πŸ”” of

Article 86(2) EC would have led to a different result from the reply which I am going

to propose πŸ”” should be given by the Court to the question from the referring court.

221.

In view of the case-law on the πŸ”” implications of Article 86(2) EC, the exception,

provided for by that Article, to the application of the rules of the πŸ”” Treaty aiming to

establish a common market can apply only if the task of the entity holding the monopoly

makes πŸ”” it necessary to set aside those rules. In other words, the applicability of the

exception is subject to proof that πŸ”” application of the rules would make it impossible to

perform that task. ( )

222. I believe that examination of that πŸ”” condition would have led

to consideration of the adequacy of the disputed legislation for achieving its aims and

of its πŸ”” proportionality comparable with the examination which I shall make in the

context of its compatibility by reference to the relevant πŸ”” freedom of movement.

223. I

shall show that the disputed legislation should, with regard to the facts of the main

proceedings, πŸ”” be examined by reference to Article 49 EC because it constitutes a

restriction within the meaning of that Article. I πŸ”” shall then consider whether such

legislation can be justified.

a) The relevant freedom of movement

224. Like the Liga,

Bwin, the Netherlands, πŸ”” Austrian and Portuguese Governments and also the Commission, I

am of the opinion that the compatibility of the legislation in πŸ”” question with Community

law must be examined by reference to the articles of the Treaty concerning the freedom

to provide πŸ”” services, and by reference to them alone.

225. It is clear from the

information provided by the referring court that Bwin πŸ”” is established in Gibraltar and

that it carries on its activities in Portugal by means of the internet. We have πŸ”” already

seen that it has been held that a provider established in one Member State who offers

by internet, without πŸ”” moving from that State, games on line to recipients established in

another Member State, provides services within the meaning of πŸ”” Article 50 EC. ( )

226.

It is true that the contested provisions, in so far as they reserve such activities πŸ”” for

the Santa Casa, are also capable of constituting a restriction of the freedom of

establishment. However, as Bwin has πŸ”” not sought to establish itself in Portugal, that

freedom of movement is not relevant to the outcome of the main πŸ”” proceedings. The Belgian

Government’s claim that the Liga acts de facto as Bwin’s intermediary does not refute

this conclusion.

227. It πŸ”” must be borne in mind that the freedom of establishment

confers upon companies or firms formed in accordance with the πŸ”” law of a Member State and

having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business

within the Community, πŸ”” the right to exercise their activity in the Member State

concerned through a subsidiary, a branch or an agency, ( πŸ”” ) that is to say, a secondary

establishment controlled by the company or firm in question. However, the agreement

between πŸ”” the applicants in the main proceedings does not have the object or effect of

placing the Liga under Bwin’s control πŸ”” or of making it a secondary establishment of

Bwin.

228. Finally, with regard to the free movement of capital and payments, πŸ”” it cannot

be denied that the contested provisions are capable of restricting payments between

persons residing in Portugal and Bwin. πŸ”” However, that is only a consequence of the fact

that the latter is prohibited from supplying on-line games services to πŸ”” persons residing

in Portuguese territory.

229. As the Commission correctly observes, given that the

restrictive effects of national legislation on the πŸ”” free movement of payments are merely

an inevitable consequence of the restriction imposed on the provision of services, it

is πŸ”” not necessary to consider whether that legislation is compatible with Article 56 EC.

( )

230. I therefore propose that Court πŸ”” should construe the referring court’s question

in the following way: must Article 49 EC be interpreted as meaning that it πŸ”” precludes

legislation of a Member State whereby the exclusive right to organise and operate

lotteries and off-course betting in the πŸ”” entire territory of that State conferred on a

single non-profit-making entity controlled by that State is extended to all means πŸ”” of

electronic communication, in particular the internet?

b) The existence of a

restriction

231. There appears to be no doubt, and the πŸ”” Portuguese Government does not

deny, that the provisions in question constitute a restriction of the freedom to

provide services.

232. Those πŸ”” provisions prohibit a provider of on-line games

established in a Member State other than the Portuguese Republic from offering

lotteries πŸ”” and off‑course betting on the internet to consumers residing in the latter

State. As we have seen, Article 49 EC πŸ”” requires the elimination of measures prohibiting

the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he

πŸ”” lawfully provides similar services. Moreover, Article 49 EC is for the benefit of both

providers and recipients of services. ( πŸ”” )

233. Finally, it has already been held that

legislation of a Member State prohibiting an undertaking established in another Member

πŸ”” State collecting bets from offering its services on the internet to recipients

established in the first State constitutes a restriction πŸ”” within the meaning of Article

49 EC. ( )

c) The justification for the restriction

234. A restriction such as that

provided πŸ”” for by the legislation in question conforms with Community law if it is

justified by an overriding reason relating to πŸ”” the public interest, if it is appropriate

for ensuring the attainment of the aim which it pursues and if it πŸ”” does not exceed what

is necessary for attaining it. In any event, it must not be applied in a discriminatory

πŸ”” way.

235. In accordance with that principle common to all economic activities which

have not been harmonised, the Member State responsible πŸ”” for the restriction in question

must demonstrate that it is necessary in order to achieve the declared objective, and

that πŸ”” that objective could not be achieved by less restrictive measures. ( )

i)

Arguments of the parties

236. The Liga and Bwin πŸ”” assert that the Santa Casa’s exclusive

right to offer lotteries and off-course betting on the internet to consumers residing

in πŸ”” Portuguese territory amounts to the complete closure of the market for on-line games

in that State, which constitutes the most πŸ”” serious breach of the freedom to provide

services. They claim that the restriction is not justified.

237. According to the Liga

πŸ”” and Bwin, Portugal ought to have demonstrated, first, that the problem alluded to by

the restrictive measure is really a πŸ”” serious problem in its territory, second, that that

measure is capable of remedying the problem and, finally, that there was πŸ”” no less

restrictive way of resolving it.

238. The Liga and Bwin contend that the Santa Casa’s

exclusive rights are unlikely πŸ”” to achieve the desired purposes because Portugal is not

pursuing a consistent and systematic policy of restricting gaming activities, as

πŸ”” required by the case-law. In reality, it is only aiming to increase the revenue from

games of chance and gambling. πŸ”” The Liga and Bwin assert that the games offered by the

Santa Casa have expanded considerably in recent years, encouraged πŸ”” by aggressive

advertising. They also state that the Portuguese Republic is actively pursuing a policy

of increasing the level of πŸ”” gaming taking place in casinos.

239. Finally, the Liga and

Bwin submit that the objectives pursued by the Portuguese legislation in πŸ”” question could

be attained in the same way, if not better, by a less restrictive measure, such as

opening the πŸ”” market to a limited number of private operators who would have specific

obligations. In that connection, the Liga and Bwin πŸ”” point out that the Gibraltar

legislation to which Bwin is subject is some of the strictest in Europe. In addition,

πŸ”” Bwin is said to be a pioneer in drawing up rules intended to ensure responsible gaming

to protect consumers, and πŸ”” also in setting up internal procedures to prevent money

laundering.

240. The Portuguese Government observes that the monopoly which the Santa

πŸ”” Casa has had since the 18th century is a legitimate expression of the Government’s

discretionary power. The grant of an πŸ”” exclusive right to the Santa Casa accords with the

aim of restricting the practice of lotteries and off-course betting in πŸ”” order to limit

the social risks associated with gaming of that kind and to employ the revenue from

them for πŸ”” social causes. The extension of the monopoly to internet games was a necessary

and appropriate measure for offering such games πŸ”” on line in a safe and controlled

way.

241. The Portuguese Government submits that the Santa Casa’s monopoly conforms

with Community πŸ”” law because it is a non-discriminatory and proportionate measure. The

Government adds that the grant of an exclusive right to πŸ”” a body such as the Santa Casa,

which functions under the strict control of the Government, is more likely to πŸ”” attain

the objectives pursued.

ii) My assessment

242. I shall begin by indicating what ought

to be the effect, in my view, πŸ”” of the limits imposed on the powers of the Member States

by the freedoms of movement in the area of πŸ”” games of chance and gambling. I shall then

set out the reasons why the protection of consumers and the maintaining πŸ”” of public order

may justify measures restricting the freedom to provide off-course betting on the

internet. Next I shall describe πŸ”” the criteria for determining whether the legislation in

question is appropriate for attaining the aims it pursues and whether it πŸ”” goes beyond

those aims. Finally, I shall point out that the referring court must ensure that the

contested restriction is πŸ”” applied in a non-discriminatory way.

– The effect of the

limits imposed on the powers of the Member States in the πŸ”” area of games of chance and

gambling

243. It is not disputed that, in the absence of harmonised rules at Community

πŸ”” level in the gaming sector, Member States remain competent to define the conditions for

the pursuit of activities in that πŸ”” sector. However, they must, when exercising their

powers in this area, respect the freedoms of movement. ( )

244. I think πŸ”” an assessment

of the effect of that limitation on the powers of the Member States should start from

the following πŸ”” premise.

245. In my view, Community law does not aim to subject games of

chance and gambling to the laws of πŸ”” the market. The establishment of a market which

would be as open as possible was intended by the Member States πŸ”” as the basis of the

European Economic Community because competition, if it is fair, generally ensures

technological progress and improves πŸ”” the qualities of a service or product while

ensuring a reduction in costs. It therefore benefits consumers because they can πŸ”” also

benefit from products and services of better quality at a better price. In that way

competition is a source πŸ”” of progress and development.

246. However, these advantages do

not arise in the area of games of chance and gambling. Calling πŸ”” for tenders from service

providers in that field, which would necessarily lead them to offer ever more

attractive games in πŸ”” order to make bigger profits, does not seem to me a source of

progress and development. Likewise I fail to πŸ”” see what progress there would be in making

it easier for consumers to take part in national lotteries organised in πŸ”” each Member

State and to bet on all the horse races or sporting events in the Union.

247. The

situation is πŸ”” not comparable in any way with, for example, the movement of patients

within the Union, which the Court has perfectly πŸ”” legitimately promoted because it

extends the range of medical treatment offered to every citizen of the Union by giving

him πŸ”” or her access to the health services of other Member States.

248. Games of chance

and gambling, for their part, can πŸ”” only function and continue if the great majority of

players lose more than they win. Opening the market in that πŸ”” field, which would increase

the share of household budgets spent on gaming, would only have the inevitable

consequence, for most πŸ”” of them, of reducing their resources.

249. Therefore limiting the

powers of the Member States in the field of games of πŸ”” chance and gambling does not have

the aim of establishing a common market and the liberalisation of that area of

πŸ”” activity.

250. This is shown by the fact that the Court has consistently held that the

Member States have a broad πŸ”” discretion, not only to determine the level of consumer

protection and to maintain public order in relation to games of πŸ”” chance and gambling,

but also in relation to the arrangements for organising them.

251. This conclusion also

appears to be corroborated πŸ”” by the fact that the Court has held that the Member States

may legitimately determine the appropriation of the revenue πŸ”” from games of chance and

gambling and may thus decide that private interests should not profit from them.

252.

Consequently a πŸ”” Member State has sovereign power to prohibit a game in its territory, as

the Court held with regard to the πŸ”” prohibition of large-scale lotteries in the United

Kingdom in Schindler. In order to channel the provision of games into a πŸ”” controlled

system and to protect consumers from being exposed to improper encouragement, a Member

State may also grant an exclusive πŸ”” right to organise a game to a single entity or to a

limited number of operators.

253. The difficulties in determining πŸ”” whether national law

conforms with Community law arise mainly where Member States grant a single entity or a

limited number πŸ”” of operators an exclusive right to operate games of chance and

gambling.

254. The problem for national courts is in ascertaining πŸ”” the level above which

the provision of games in the context of an exclusive right exceeds what is justified

by πŸ”” the aim of channelling them into a controlled system to maintain public order and to

protect consumers from harmful gambling πŸ”” habits.

255. The national courts must therefore

determine whether the restrictive measures laid down by their domestic law are

appropriate for πŸ”” attaining their objectives of protection and proportionate when the

single entity or the operators with the exclusive right to operate πŸ”” a game of chance or

gambling offer a certain range of games and carry out some advertising.

256. In

considering whether πŸ”” the restrictive measures can attain the objectives pursued and

whether they are proportionate, I think account must be taken of πŸ”” the fact that, as

there is no Community harmonisation, determining the range of games offered and the

conditions for operating πŸ”” them are matters within the discretion of the Member States.

It falls to each Member State to assess, having regard πŸ”” to its own situation and its

social and cultural characteristics, the balance to find between, on the one hand, an

πŸ”” attractive range of games in order to satisfy the desire to gamble and to channel it

into a lawful system πŸ”” and, on the other, a range which encourages too much

gambling.

257. With regard to my premiss concerning the role of πŸ”” competition in relation

to the aims of the Union, I think that the power of the Member States should be πŸ”” limited

by Community law only to the extent of prohibiting conduct whereby a Member State

deflects restrictive measures from their πŸ”” purpose and seeks the maximum profit. In ot


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ONU adota resolução de cessar-fogo apoiada pelos EUA

Com os EUA tentando pressionar o Hamas e Israel para concordar com um πŸ’― cessar-fogo bwin nederland Gaza, a ONU votou por uma resolução proposta pelos Estados Unidos que apelasse Γ  trΓ©gua imediata.O secretΓ‘rio de πŸ’― Estado Antony Blinken esteve ontem na cidade israelense no intuito das negociaçáes sobre as medidas contra esse conflito armado entre πŸ’― israelenses do Iraque

Blinken se encontrou com o primeiro-ministro Benjamin Netanyahu de Israel. Mais cedo naquele dia, ele teve conversas no πŸ’― Cairo bwin nederland conjunto ao presidente Abdel Fattah el Sisi cujo governo ajudou a mediar as negociaçáes;

Mais de duas semanas πŸ’― se passaram desde que Israel colocou o acordo para Hamas. Mas governo israelense nΓ£o abraΓ§ou formalmente, e tambΓ©m houve nenhuma πŸ’― resposta oficial do HamΓ‘s : Netanyahu disse Γ  imprensa atΓ© as capacidades militares da organização serem destruΓ­das

Votação da ONU:

Quatorze dos πŸ’― 15 membros do conselho votaram a favor, com RΓΊssia - que tem poder de veto – abstendo-se. Ao aprovar o πŸ’― resolução o Conselho entregou uma vitΓ³ria diplomΓ‘tica aos EUA e tinha proibido trΓͺs resoluçáes anteriores sobre cessar fogo

O que vem πŸ’― a seguir:

Blinken tambΓ©m visitarΓ‘ o Catar, outro mediador entre Israel e Hamas.

MissΓ£o de refΓ©ns bwin nederland Israel:

Os moradores de Gaza descreveram πŸ’― um intenso bombardeio durante o ataque que levou ao resgate dos quatro refΓ©ns israelenses e Γ  morte das dezenas. "Todo πŸ’― hospital se tornou uma sala gigante", disse a mΓ©dica bwin nederland Faixas Gerais, segundo informaçáes da agΓͺncia Reuters

O centro se mantΓ©m πŸ’― na Europa, apesar das vitΓ³rias da direita.

Os conservadores da Europa, o Partido Popular Europeu (PEP), tiveram um desempenho forte e πŸ’― terminaram bwin nederland primeiro lugar nas eleiçáes para Parlamento europeu. Mesmo que a direita tenha feito bem nos 27 paΓ­ses europeus πŸ’― de hoje no centro do paΓ­s realizado pelo partido conservador britΓ’nico na segunda-feira (19).

Foi um sinal de que a estratΓ©gia πŸ’― do partido para integrar polΓ­ticas mais direitistas, com o objetivo impedir os eleitores da mudanΓ§a dos rivais Γ  direita. Aqui πŸ’― estΓ£o as tendΓͺncias importantes emergentes das eleiçáes:

Os Verdes:

Eles foram os maiores perdedores. Elas tiveram um bom desempenho bwin nederland 2024 e πŸ’― emergiram como uma importante potΓͺncia progressista no Parlamento, mas perderam 25% de seus assentos ”.

AfD:

O partido de extrema direita alemΓ£o πŸ’― ganhou um recorde mostrando, apesar dos dois principais candidatos serem proibidos da campanha apΓ³s uma sΓ©rie.

França:

Os analistas ainda estΓ£o analisando πŸ’― a decisΓ£o do presidente Emmanuel Macron de convocar eleiçáes antecipadas apΓ³s uma perda brutal. A escolha poderia ser um meio πŸ’― para impedir que bwin nederland oposição se organizasse - e apresentar aos eleitores com escolhas difΓ­ceis entre ele mesmo, o partido πŸ’― da extrema direita (ou seja: os partidos polΓ­ticos).

Apple entra na briga da IA

A Apple fez um esforΓ§o para entrar na πŸ’― corrida de IA generativa com planos bwin nederland levar a tecnologia aos mais do que mil milhΓ΅es usuΓ‘rios iPhone ao redor πŸ’― o mundo. Introduziu novas funcionalidades e tambΓ©m enfatizou como planejava integrar essa tΓ©cnica nos seus produtos tendo privacidade no pensamento

Ontem, πŸ’― a empresa revelou que estaria usando IA generativa para alimentar o chamado Apple Intelligence. O sistema priorizarΓ‘ mensagens e notificaçáes; πŸ’― oferecerΓ‘ ferramentas de escrita capazes da revisΓ£o do texto ou sugestΓ΅es: tambΓ©m resultarΓ‘ bwin nederland uma grande atualização na Siri – πŸ’― algo com os quais ela deixou cair as mΓ£os

A Apple fechou um acordo com a OpenAI, fabricante do ChatGPT para πŸ’― apoiar algumas de suas capacidades.

MAIS NOTCIAS TOPO

Os EUA uma vez olharam para a construção modular como um modo eficiente de πŸ’― construir lotes da habitação rapidamente. A ideia fez pouco impacto nos Estados Unidos, que ainda estΓ‘ construindo casas suficientes apenas πŸ’― por manter o status quo mas essa idΓ©ia influenciou radicalmente paΓ­ses tais quais JapΓ£o e SuΓ©cia hoje lΓ­deres na πŸ’― fabricação industrializada do lar!

Neste



, a colaboradora do Times Francesca Mari detalha o processo de construção da casa bwin nederland 30 πŸ’― minutos com um passeio pela fΓ‘brica Lindbcks.

HΓ‘ 25 anos, Hannibal era um novo tipo de livro blockbuster.

"O SilΓͺncio dos Inocentes", πŸ’― publicado bwin nederland 1988, introduziu milhΓ΅es de leitores ao psiquiatra assassino e Γ  gourmand.

TrΓͺs anos depois, o livro tornou-se um filme πŸ’― e os fΓ£s estavam desesperados por uma sequΓͺncia.

Mas Thomas Harris, o autor do livro desapareciu bwin nederland bwin nederland escrita lenta e πŸ’― metΓ³dica. Finalmente ele publicou "Hannibal" no ano 1999: os fΓ£s limparam seus calendΓ‘rioes; varejistas prepararem suas prateleirase crΓ­ticos afiaram as πŸ’― facadas deles...

Foi tambΓ©m uma das primeiras grandes publicaçáes da era hiperspeed, hyperopinionado internet. O exagero atiΓ§ou as chamas e ajudou πŸ’― imortalizar o personagem!

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